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Technological Capabili"SY in the Forest Product Sector of 
British Columbia: kl Exploratory Inquiry 
Roger Hayter 
This paper seeks to define and explain the level of technological 
capability in British Columbia's forest product sector. For its point of 
departure the discussion accepts the Science Council of Canada's inter-
;ire-'::ation 8f technological capability as "the ability to solve scientific 
and technological problems and to follON, assess and exploit scientific 
and technological developments" (Britton and Gilmour, 1978, p. 130). 
The notion of technological capability therefore refers to complex processes 
comprising research and development activities involved in the discovery of 
inventions, acts of innovation and the subsequent adaptations made to 
innovations when introduced into new organizational, sector and regional 
environments. 
It is widely accepted that in comparison with the United States and 
other capitalist countries Canadian industry's performance in research 
and development CR & D) is poor in absolute and relative tenns: In 1978 
R & D emoloyrrent in manufacturing industries, for example. accounted for 
only one per cent of total employment (Stats. Can., 1979, cat. 13-203) 
while total funds for intra-mural R & D were foss than $lb (Tab1e 1). 
Table 1 
Sources of Funds for Intramural R & D 1963-1978 
Federal Provincial 
Government Governments Business Foreign Total 
SM 
1963 28. 9 0.1 141+. 2 7.2 180.4 
1970 62.4 0.8 330.8 19.1 413.0 
1975 86.0 4.0 56S.4 41.1 696 .5 
1978e 115.0 30.0 732 .5 50.0 927.5 
Source: Statistics Canada, 1979, cat. no. 13-203. 
----------------~------~....--------- ~ f 
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According to Statistics Canada (1979, cat. no. 13-203) Canada's 
intramural expenditures in 1975 were 0. 60 per cent of industrial dorrestic 
product compared to 1.58% for West Germany, 1.199.i for Japan, 1. 71% for 
Sweden, 1.74% for the U.K. and 1.92% for the U.S. 
While there is little doubt that Canada's R & D effort is small in 
scale there is controversy as to why this is so and the nature of the 
associated economic and social implications. Explanations for the relatively 
lcw level of R & D activity in Canada, for example, have variously stressed 
protectionism, small market size, inadequate labour skills, lack of 
effective gove:rnrrent action, risk-averse entrepreneurship, high levels of 
corporate conrentration and high levels of foreign cwnership. These and 
other detenninants of the level of R & D activity which have been suggested 
in the literature, hcwever, can be conveniently polarized into conventional 
explanations which stress the role of cost-revenue conditions and 
institutional interpretations which stress the role of corporate (and 
governrrent) policies and structures. 
According to conventional wisdom industrial research and development 
functions actually (and should) locate as costs and revenues dictate so 
that the relative poverty of Canada's technological effort simply reflects 
a lack of comparative advantage. In this regard, limited and high cost 
supplies of appropriately skilled labour and (especially) limited market 
potentials are frequently cited ccmparative disadvantages (e.g. Palda, 
1979). It is also worth noting that according to this view the lack of 
R & D does not by itself constitute "a problem". Rather what is emphasized 
is industry's willingness and ability· to innovate. In this regard, 
economists such as IE.ly (1979), Safarian (1979) and Palda ( 1979) argue 
that protectionism militates against innovation and underlies Canada's productivi 
problems, particularly in the secondary rnanuf acturing sector. Free trade, 
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they argue, would encourage industry to becorre more efficient since the 
pressures of international competition would force finns to specialize 
more (thereby achieving econanies of scale) and to more quickly adopt 
the latest technologies. 
In contrast to the free trade or internationalist position, over 
the past decade or so the Science Council of C~1nada has explained Canada's 
technological weaknesses primarily as a result of the policies and 
structures of foreign controlled corporations. Britton and Gilmour (1978), 
for example, argue that branch plants inhibit exports (of secondary rnanu-
f acturers) and by substituting corporate for local linkages, directly and 
indirectly increase import dependency on a variety of goods and services 
including research and development. Furtherrrore, given these linkages, 
they suggest free trade would simply provide cheaper imports rather than 
stimulate dcrnestic innovation and production. Consequently they urge 
that increased investment in R & D is essential to ensure innovation in 
the early stages of product life cycles when Canada as a high wage cotmtry 
can be internationally competitive while at the same time providing for 
more high status employment opportunities. In other words the Science 
Council considers R & D as an essential input to sustained industrial gro.rrth 
and as an appropriate target for development for its CM7Tl sake. 
The extent to which the Science Council's explanation of technological 
weakness has been accepted by policy makers across the country is not clear. 
At the provincial level, ha..Jever, the strategy of proiroting R & D based 
manufacturing has been accepted with grcwing enthusiasm and corrrnitrnent. In 
British Columbia, for example, Discovery Parks Inc. was established in 
1979 in order to "attract capital intensive, high technology industry 
and invesbrent to the Province of British Columbia by developing campus 
style research and development parks adjacent to major educational 
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institutions" (Discovery Parks Inc. n.d. p. 1). Whether or not the emphasis 
which has so far been placed on physical site planning and on physical 
proximity to education institutions will indeed provide the necessary 
catalyst for the stirrulation of "high technology" industry is a rroot 
point. There is also a question of product, industry or sectoral priorities, 
that is the kinds of activities that a science and technology policy in 
British Columbia should try to encourage - or the kinds of activities in 
which science and technology should be boosted. So far there seems to 
have been little discussion of these priorities. 
Just how a range of priorities to be emphasized in a science and 
technology policy should be determined is clearly problerratical. There 
are obvious difficulties in precisely predicting the pace and direction of 
inventive and innovative activity while the implications of recent innova-
tions are not necessarily limited by traditional industry boillldaries. Im 
essentially shot gun approach to research policy, however, has real 
dangers. As ~nsch (1979, p. 215) states "A strategy of try anything but 
quickly produces too many flops, and in the hurry, it suppresses the'often 
superior al temati ves at the expensive of 'anything. ' " .Assuming that there 
are benefits to be gained from specializing in the R & D effort it 
would surely seem logical for British Columbia to aspire to high levels 
of technological capability in at least the established resource based 
sectors. Indeed in a report submitted to the· provincial govemrrent in 19 76 
reco~nding policies rrobilizing the province's capabilities in applied 
research, consistent with economic development goals, Gaudry (1976) 
urged just such an emphasis. Further, as Gilrrour (1978, p. 20) has noted 
on behalf of the Science Coilllcil,the case for developing indigenous 
technological capability "is not exclusive to the so-called high technology 
industries: it W1derlies production and other technical change in all 
- 5 -
goods producing industries." Britton (1980) has also expressed the view 
that an important priority for technological policy in Canada should be 
the resource based industries. 
In essence the rrost appealing case for emphasizing technological 
capability in the resource industries is that it is consistent with the 
principle of comparative advantage. Such a policy wou1d draw upon and 
contribute tc:Mards accumulated investrrents in physical and hum:m. resources, 
it may lead to the exploitation of hitherto untapped resources and would 
help maintain competitiveness in key sectors of the economy. fas Gaudry 
(1976) points out, however, the forrrnllation of effective science policies 
for industry first requires an inventory and evaluation of existing 
capabilities. To contribute towards such an inventory and evaluation this 
paper examines the evolution and level of technological capability in the 
forest product sector of British Columbia. Methodologically, the study 
focusses on performance and characteristics at the level of the individual 
firm (and establishment) and conceptually it leans heavily on a frarrework 
initially proposed by Freeman (1974) and adapted by the Science Council of 
Canada (Britton and Gilmour, 1978). This framework is now outlined. 
The Technological Strategies of Firms (and Economies) 
As Freeman (1974, p. 256) notes firm; operate within environrrents 
which offer them a range of technological as well as market possibilities. 
It is certainly true that fiTIIB can "accept the supply of inventions and 
innovations as given, and attempt to TIEXJ.JillZe ••• access to available 
inventions and innovations " (Thomas and 1.eHeron, 1975, p. 236). While 
such access nay be accomplished by intelligence networks (including illegal 
ones) and roving technical scouts such "counterpunching skills" are 
only perrnissable in certain situations such as industries characterized 
~+----~-----------------------............. _.,.. 
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by a relatively free flaw of information or in regions where firms enJOY 
distinct processing or marketing advantages. Finrs can of course supple-
rrent rronitoring of technological change by investing in their own 
R & D. It is important to recognize, however, that in societies 
characterized by more or less continuous technological change surviving 
firms must employ at least an implicit technological strategy. In this 
regaro, and to provide a basis for understanding the wide spectrum of 
technological choices available to firms, Freerran (1974) has classified 
technological innovation 
"defensive", and "offensive". 
as "traditional", "dependent", "imitative", 
According to Freeman in the traditional firm technology is based on 
craft skills and is essentially "non-innovative". The dependent firm 
also makes no attempt to initiate technical or product change except at 
the specific request of its customers, or parent, who will also provide 
the expertise to irnpleirent the requested changes. According to Britton 
and Gilm::mr (1978, p. 135) "A very large number of Canadian firms both 
foreign and dorrestically controlled fall into this category". Im. imitative 
strategy involves the firm in adaptive R & D in order to copy the technological 
Jeaders and combined with other advantages this can provide the basis for 
corporate market growth. Finnlly there are the offensive and defensive 
firms both of which rely heavily on intramural R & D especially in the 
areas of applied research and design engineering. The differences between 
the two strategies are in the timing and nature of innovation. In 
particular, offensive firms strive successfully for technical and market 
leadership in the intrDduction of new prDducts and prDcesses while the 
defensive firm is content to be soIIEwhat later and to try to take 
advantage of any errors made by the early innovators without being left 
behind. 
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While f'rBeIIBil articulated this classification as a contribution to 
a IIDre realistic theory of the firm his concepts have been used to 
interpret the technological strategies and technological needs of 
societies in different stages of industrialization. In particular, Britton 
and GilJIDur (1978) have adopted such a perspective by which to better 
understand the level of technological capability throu?}'lout the Canad:idn 
econorrv (see Table 2). 
Thus Britton and Gilrrour classify societies in terms of traditional, 
dependent, imitative, defensive and offensive technological strategies which 
are respectively related to non-industrialized, industrializing, semi-
industrialized, industrialized and post-industrial stages of developrrent. 
In turn, these strategies-and-stage.s imply a different bundle of technical 
skills and changes in the relative importance of technology imports and 
exports. Thus with industrial developrrent this frarrework suggests increased 
technological sophistication and in particular the errergence of specialized 
R & D functions, graving interdependencies or liasions aTIDng R & D and related 
activities and the export of technology. 
With reference to the relationships between industrialization and 
technological capability so outlined (in Table 2) several additional cormrents 
are pertinent. First technology evolves along qualitative as well as 
quantitative dirrensions. Thus while all societies have a technolof,ical base 
'JIDdern' technology and the relationships between science and society :in 
the 20th C'.entury are f undarrentally different from those of previous periods. 
In particular, Freeman (1974, pp. 29-31) notes that R & D has becorre m::::>re 
professionalized, that is a larger proportion of R & D is nc:M carried out 
within industry and has increasingly involved the application of formally 
leaxned scientific principles to whole systerrs. 
Table 2 
Felationship Between Technology I:eveloprrent Strateg;ies, Technology Resources and Industrial I:eveloprrent 
Technology I:evelop-Strategy Errphasis Major 01aracteristics Technical S~i].ls -· _ JT£nt: Capability Traditional Local No contacts with foreign 1.DNer TIBI1agerrent training None -(Non-indus- Technology technology Technology Technician training Gradual creation trialized) based on traditional Vocational training of an industrial 
I.€pendent 
(Indus-
trializing) 
Imitative 
( Semi-indus-
trialized) 
I:efensive 
(Indus-
trialized) 
Offensive 
(Post-indus-
trial) 
Tertiary 
Technology 
(diffusion 
of existing 
Technology) 
Tertiary 
Technology 
(diffusion 
of existing 
Technology) 
Secondary 
Irmovation 
Original 
Irmovation 
skills No product General education rrentality and climate changes ( no deTIBI1d for 
it) 
Satellite role to tech-
nology stronger countries; 
long technology gap; 
imp::>rting know-how Copying (little product change) 
Follcwing the leader 
country with a short T gap ; 
imp::>rting proprie·tary tech-
nology (patents, licences) 
Process inproverrents Foreign 
technology adaptation 
Follcwing the leader 
country as closely as pos-
sible "Catch-up and over 
take" objective. Product 
differentiation 
First in the world in 
products and process 
irmovation "Maintain the 
leadership objective" 
Frontier research 
Pnxl.uction engineering 
Project evaluation 
Industrial eng. and 
JTBnagerrent Basic 
general eng. capability 
.A::laptive developrrent 
Consultant services 
resign engineering (adaptive design) 
Strong R & D capability 
I:esign engineering 
Production eng. 
Frontier R & D 
In'Rstrrent projects 
fo:nration and evalu-
ation (including 
evaluation and selec-
tion of technology) 
f\daptation of foreign 
technology 
Generation of new tech-
nology packages .Adap-
tation and i!q)roverrent 
of foreign technology 
Generation of new 
original technology 
Source: Britton and Gilrrour, 1978, p. 136. (adapted from Carrere). 
(X) 
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Second, for any given society (or firm for that matter) the technological 
strategies identified are not mutually exclusive. In other words, a society 
can exhibit dependent, imitative and offensive characteristics simultaneously. 
In this regard it might be noted that the existence of branch plants 
affiliated to offensive firrrs does not provide the host envirorurent with the 
technological capability of the parent firm. 
Third, while it is appropriate to think of societies evolving along 
a continuum of technological capability the process is not automatic. The 
previously noted view that it is cheaper for Canada to purchase imported 
technology rather than develop a greater indigeneous capability, for example, 
is essentially the equivalent of freezing teclu1ological evolution in the 
dependent and imi titati ve stages. Indeed, there are good reasons for 
believing active governrrent :pJlicies are needed to prorrote R & D especially, 
but not only, in the high technology industries (see Mcfetridge, 1978). 
Fourth, technological evolution is not necessarily dependent upon 
'rnaj or breakthroughs' : 
"it must always be rerrernbered that after the introduction 
of a new process or the construction of a new plant, many 
minor technical improverrents will be made. These will not 
necessarily be recorded in patent statistics , both for reasons 
of secrecy and for patentabili ty. . . . in the case of 
Du Pont' s rayon plants , many of the minor technical improve-
rrents were not patented but were together rrore important 
in their contribution to productivity than the major 
changes" (Freeman, 1974, p. 94). 
Indeed, in the "mature" industries, such as the forest product sector 
the cumulative impacts of minor or increrrental technical improverrents are 
likely to dominate contributions to productivity change. 
Finally, and on a rrore rrethodological note, it is important to 
recognize that Freeffi3Il' r; classification of technological strategies, and 
the rrodification adopted by Britton and Gilrrour, is explorntory and 
relationships are expressed only in broad qualitative terms. Conventional, 
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rrore quantitative 'diffusion of innovation' studies, however, tend to adopt 
a too restricted a perspective in which wider social, political and tech-
nological conditions are held constant. The approach reviewed here, on the 
other hand, at least attempts to mike explicit the interrelationships between 
technology arid industrialization in a nore comprehensive way. 
Objective and Scope 
This study seeks to determine and explain the contemporary level of 
technological capability in the forest product sector of British Columbia. 
The guiding thesis is that given its size, rate of growth and relative 
importance within B. C. , a high level of technological capability in the 
sector can be expected. While technological capability is difficult to 
define succinctly, since it is an umbrella concept incoqx:>rating complex 
scientific, engineering and entrepreneurial processes, R & D activities are 
clearly central to any such assess:rrent. In this regard it is useful to 
interpret, as industry does , R & D in terns of a basic research - applied 
research - developrrent - technology transfer continuum (see furnas, 19 5 8, pp. 1-15). 
Simply and conventionally stated basic research involves the search for 
funda:rrental laws and is the study of the pheno:rrenon of nature and society for its a 
sake. Applied research, on the other hand, focusses the results of basic 
research to a specific process, material or device, that it is to an industrial 
scale, to :rreet a defined coJTDTercial objective. As Furness points out applied 
research emphasizes identification of new products and processes and "usually 
carries an investigation up to the point of the first successful working rrodel 
of a :rrechanical or electrical device, or through the usual glassware stage in 
a chemical synthesis" (furness, 1958, p. 7). In the developrrent stage 
scientists, such as chemists, physicists and rreta11urgists, are increasingly 
replaced by engineers and is defined by Furness (p. 8) as "the application of 
s: 
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technology to the irnproveITEnt, testing, and evaluation of a process, material 
or device resulting from applied resean:::h." It might be noted that developITEnt 
includes the design, building and running of pilot plants, as well as an 
evaluation of their products. Subsequent application of research at an 
industrial site with actual or potential custoners, as well as related rra:rket 
research and evaluation, is here considered to represent the "technological 
transfer" stage of R & D. In this stage engineering is involved in, first, 
process design (product specifications, process flew, scale of operations) 
and with rrechanical design (facility layout, foundation design, supply of 
plant infrastructure etc. ) . 
Bearing in mind these definitions it is argued that technological 
capability in the forest product sector can be usefully indicated by the 
number, size and scope of specialized R & D activities, by the nature and 
extent of R & D liaisons and by the level of exports of technological 
expertise whether in the form of information, direct investJTEnt or the sale 
of equiprrent. llire specifically this study examines, first, specialized R & D 
laboratories notably thosed opeIB.ted or sponsored by the forest product 
manufacturing finrs in tenrs of evolution, employITEnt, activity, product or 
process orientation and relative emphasis on the basic research - applied -
developrrent - technology transfer continuum. Second, capital goods 
manufacturers to the forest product sector are examined in terrrs of industrial 
and organizational characteristics, the nature of R & D work and levels of 
export activity. Finally, the size and scope of the engineering consulting 
cornrrn.mity is assessed to determine their contribution to the technological 
capability of B. C. 's forest product sector. 
InforrrBtion was drawn from two main sources: open ended interviews 
• with executives or managers responsible for (private sector ftmded) R & D 
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programrres and with senior personnel in consul ting engineering firns; and a 
questionnaire survey of capital goods manufacturers. In addition several 
Statistics C-anada publications and Patent Statistics were surveyed. Be-cause 
of limitations of tiJIE and resources this study was limited to activities 
operating in , or supported by, the private sector, and located within the 
Vancouver JIEtropoli tan area. Thus academic ins ti tut ions , notably the forestry 
faculty at U.B.C., and exclusively governrrent agencies such as the Pacific 
Forest Research Centre at Victoria were excluded. The level of govemJIEnt 
and academic research related to the forest resource throughout C-anada, 
however, is corrprehensively discussed by Smith and Lessard (1971). Within 
these constraints there is no rBason to believe the study contains any 
JIEthocological biases. 
To introduce the analysis R & D activity in the Canadian forest product 
sector as a whole is briefly outlined. 
Research and Ieveloprrent in the Canadian Forest Product Sector 
Useful aggregate indexes of the search for innovation in the Canadian 
forest product sector viz ~ viz other industries are provided by dollar 
expenditures on R & D. (Table 3) and by patent statistics (Table 4). 
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Table 3 
Total Intramural Expenditures, by Industry 
1972 1976 1978 
--
$M 
Mines & Wells 27.3 40.9 50.3 Chemical Based 95.4 162.3 20'Ll Wood Based 19.6 34.0 110. s (Wood) (1.1) (2.0) (2. 3) (Pulp & Paper) (18.5) (32.0) (38.2) 
tt=tals 48.0 76.9 91~. 7 
Machinery & Transportation 100.0 146.7 270.0 Electrical 114.1 166.0 195.8 Other Manufacturing 7.6 9.1 11.6 Other Industries 47.4 90.9 107. 0 
459.3 729.9 927. 5 
Source: Statistics Canada, 1979, cat 13-203. 
Ps indicated in Table 3 intramural R & D expenditures by the wood based 
industries in 1978 anounted to only $40 m or 4.4% of the total. These 
industries of course are not noted for being research intensive compared to 
say chemicals and electrical products. Nevertheless, the forest product 
industries are Canada's most important economically and in view of the fact 
pulp and paper activities armually accotmt for arol.Il1d $7 b m revenues R & D 
a.JIDunting to $38 mis to say the least JIDdest - about 0. 5% of gross sales. 
While patent statistics may appear JIDre useful than expenditure figures, 
since they represent a count of actual inventions, not all inventions are 
patented, soIIE inventions are never used, the number of patents give no 
indication of importance and the ownership characteristics of patents can be 
misleading (see Schmookler, 1966). Nevertheless patent statistics are at 
least useful for broad cornparati ve purposes regarding the level of inventive 
activity. In the context of 24 ffi311ufacturing activities, for example, 
the paper and allied industry ranked eight in terms of (potential) ~of 
patented inventions in 1976 and fourteenth in term=; of (probable) m:mufacture 
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Table 4 
PYDbable Industry of Potential Use and of P:robable Manufacture of Canadian Patented Inventions, b:t: Year of Patent Grant 
Industry of Potential Use Industry of PYDbable Manuf ac 
1972 1976 % 1972 1976 
--Food & Beverages , Tobacco 3.2 3.2 0.9 1. 0 Rubber and Plastics 3.1 2.6 3.2 3.2 Leather, Textiles, Clothing 2.7 2.1 2.8 2.1 Wood 1. 2 1. 2 0.9 0.7 Furniture & Fixtures 0.6 1. 2 2.2 2.1 Paper & Allied 3.3 2.7 2.6 1. 6 Printing, Publishing 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 Prirrary ~tals (Ferrous) 1. 3 1. 6 0.3 0.5 Prirrary ~tals (Non- Ferrous) 1.4 1. 9 0.9 0.4 M=tal Fabricating 3.8 4.3 12.1 16.4 Agricultural Implerrents 1. 0 0.6 3.1 1. 3 Industrial Machinery 5.5 5.1 25.2 24.4 Off ice Machinery 0.9 1. 2 1.1 1. 0 Aircraft 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.1 :tvbtor Vehicles £ Parts 4.0 3.8 4.6 4.4 Other Transportation 2.9 1. 7 3.5 1. 9 Corranunications Equiprrent 4.6 5.0 8.4 8.4 Electrical Industrial Equiprrent 2.1 1. 7 3.6 2.5 Other Electrical Equiprrent 1. 3 2.0 3.3 3. 8 Synthetic Resins 1. 2 1. 0 1.1 1. 2 PharrrB.centicals 1.1 2.1 0.4 1. 2 Other Oiernicals 4.2 3.4 4.6 5.4 Scientific/P:rufessional Equip. 1.4 2.5 5.7 8.4 Other 5.0 3.7 8.6 7.8 Total Manufacturing 57.3 52.8 
Source: Statistics Canada, 1979, cat. no. 13-203. 
3.C 
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Table 5 
Inventors and Owners of Patents Issued in the Canadian Forest 
Product Sector 1950 - 1975' 
Individual(s) 
Organizations 
Patent 
Inventors (%) 
67') (709,;) 
288 
Table 6 
Patent 
Owners (%) 
lJ (1.1+%) 
791 (98. 6%) 
Location of Inventors and Owners of Patents Issued in 
the Canadian Forest Product Sector 1950 - 1975' 
Location Inventor(%) Owner(%) 
British Columbia 37 (3.8) 20 (2.5) 
Fest of Canada 111 (12.0) 95 (12.0) 
United St ates 621 (64.0) 550 (68.0) 
Europe 179 (19. 0) 124 (16. 0) 
Elsewhere 19 (2.0) 15 (2.0) 
Table 7 
location of Country with Printy Date on Patents Issued 
in the Canadian Forest Product Sector 1950 - 1975' 
location 
Canada 
United States 
Europe 
Elsewhere 
' Approximately a 10% sample. 
Number (%) 
1 
499 (74.4) 
158 (20.5) 
13 (1.9) 
Source : Patents , Bureau of Intellectual Property, Conswrer and 
Corporate Affairs. 
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of such patents (Table 4). WCX)d products was near the bottom in both cases. 
It might also be noted that in terrrB of industry of probable rnanuf acture the 
industrial machinery industry is easi_ly the IIDSt ilTI±ortant source of patents. 
To obtain further insights regarding patents taken out for use in the 
Canadian forest product sector a 10% sample of the rronthly patent statistics 
published by Statistics Canada was surveyed between 1950-1975. Selected 
characteristics of the jndividual patents were then coded and computed. 
Several observations are worth rnaJdng. First in the majority of cases (70%) 
inventors were indi v.i duals while in virtually all cases ( 9 8. 6 % ) patent owners 
were organizations (Table 5). It is not known, however, the extent to 
which indi vidua.ls were employed by the patent owners. Second, with respect 
to place of residence inventors and patent owners were largely located 
outside B.C. and outside C.anada (Table 6). Third, the priority date for 
95% of the patents was before 1950 and in virtually 75% of the cases the 
coillltry with the priority date was the United States (Table 7). Fourth, 77.5% 
of the patents sampled were process oriented which is contrary to the general 
trend for all industries. Between 1972 and 1978, for example, about 90% 
of the patents taken out by Canada inventors were for products (Statistic 
Canada, Cat. No. 8203 1979, p. 47) while an earlier study showed 68% of 
patents granted were for products (op.cit. , 1979, p. 43). Fifth, the intra-
sectoral distribution of patents indicates that 72.9% were 111 pulp and paper 
with 29. 3% in paper converting activities (Table 8). This is to be expected 
since pulp and paper• mills are generally rrore capital intensive and technologically 
rrore sophisticated compared to wood processing uni ts. However, with respect 
to inventors based in B. C. alrrost half of the patents issued were in wood 
processing activities (Table 9). In other words, B.C.'s inventive activity as 
rreasured by patents appears to be not only relatively sm:lll in scale in total 
but also relatively concentrated in the low technology activities of the 
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Table 8 
Intra-sectoral Distribution of Patents Issued lil the Canadian Forest Product 
Sector 1950 - 1975 
Sector 
logging operations 
Sawmills 
Plywood mills 
Other Wood mills 
Pulp mills 
Primary paper mills 
Paper converting mills 
Table 9 
Number (%) 
85 (8.8) 
58 (6.0) 
31 (].'.?) 
89 (9. 2) 
167 (17. 3) 
254 (26.3) 
283 (29. 3) 
The location of Inventors and the Intra-sectoral Distribution of Patents Issued 
in the Canadian Forest Product Sector 1950 - 1975 1 
location of Inventor (%) 
British Rest of United 
Sector Columbia Canada States I:urope Elsewhere 
logging 7 10 50 16 1 
Wood 16 20 94 47 1 
Pulp 5 23 100 35 4 
Primary paper 1 21 175 48 8 
Paper converting 8 36 201 33 5 
'Approximately a 10% Sample. 
Source: Patents, Bureau of Intellectual Properly, Consurrer and Corporate Affairs. 
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forest product sector. 
Research and Ievelq?rrent laboratories in B. C. 's Fore:3t Product Sector 
Selected characteristics of research and developrrent laboratories 
located in the Vancouver rretropoli tan area and owned or sponsored by forest 
product ITBnufacturers firms have been tabulated (Table 10). While there are 
only six of them these facilities may be readily disaggregated into company 
a-.ined or operated R & D, Industry Association R & D and joint governrrent-
industry R & D. 
Company R & D: Arrnng the forest product manufacturing firms MacMillan 
Bloedel's (MB's) R & D effort, based at its East Vancouver laboratory, is 
easily the 11'DSt significant in British Colurribia in quantitative and qualitative 
terms. The facility is well equipped and includes, for example, printing 
presses, digesters, a scanning electronic microscope, nu:rrerous testing devices 
(such as a prufbau tester, lint roughness tester etc.) and various scientific 
instrurrents. The laboratory also has a machine shop and it has IIBilUf actured 
its CMn equiprrent and instrurrents which are used in MB's mills. MB's R & D 
budget and employrrent is typically the largest or second largest annng 
Canadian forest product finrs. In 1977 MB was the 11th ranked R & D spender in 
all Canadian industry (Skeklasa, 1978, p. 35). In 1978 MB spent $6.8 m 
on R & D which arrounted to 16.8% of all intra-mural R & Din the fon=st 
product sector in Canada. In terms of employrrent the laboratory's 65 
professionals include chemists, chemical engineers, physicists, rrechanical 
engineers, wood technologists, mathematicians and computing scientists. In 
addition to these R & D professionals a further 10 are employed in logging 
research and another 21 in forestry research (mainly genetics) at Nanaimo. 
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Table 10 
Specialized R & D Facilities located in the Vancouver :t1etrupolitan .Area and 
Serving the Forest Product Industries 
Affiliation/location 
A. Company R & D 
MacMillan Bloedel 
Research , E. 
Vancouver 
Canadian Forest 
Products , New 
Westminster 
Crown Zellerbach 
Canada, Richnond 
B. Association R & D 
Council of Forest 
Industries , North 
Vancouver 
C. Governrrent-Indus-
try R & D 
Forest Engineering 
Research Institute, 
Vancouver 
Forintec, 
Vancouver (UBC) 
Source : Fieldwork 
Origins Size 19781 
1966/7. Relocation and 
expansion of pulping 
technical gn:mps recent Jy 
concentrated at Harmac. 
1958/9 following award of 
3 NRC Grants. 
1969/70 in an old special-
ity plywood plant 
1972/3 but first set up by 
PMBC in early 1950's 
1975, an offshoot of PPRIC 
in llintreal and a Fed. 
Govt. lab. in Ottawa 
1979. Privatization of 
forrrer Western Forest 
Pruduct Lab est. in 1918 
$6.8 
6~)0 :is) 
4(10) 
3(9) 
2 (10) 
$2-3m 
12 
$3m 
(110) 
Seo~ 
Applied D2velop-
1rental Product 
and Process Wood 
and Paper. 
Ieveloprrental 
Plywood Products. 
TrDuble-shooting 
Processing 
D2veloprrental 
Wood Products 
leveloprrental 
Process lDg 
harvesting and 
transportation 
Forrrerly basic 
and applied. 
Product and Process. 
Wood. 
1: Size is indicated by 1978 budget and pmfes1>ional (and total) employrrent. 
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The roots of MB Research lie in two sm:Ul teclmical groups established 
in the early 1950's at the Harmac and Pavell River pulp and paper mills and 
a few scattered technical personnel within the Building Materials Division. 
In 1966/7 these groups were first consolidated at HaTIIB.c and then re-located 
to Vancouver. At that tine the Iepartrrent had 12 professionals and scientists. 
The specific rationale underlying the creation of the Iepartrrent is not known 
although MB was in the midst of a major consolidation of its B.C. facilities 
and had recently expanded into other Provinces and overseas. Once established 
in Vancouver the initial emphasis on chemical pulping was rethodologically 
built up to include technical support for first plywood, then waferboard 
(follcwing acquisition of a waferboard mill in Saskatchewan which required 
considerable technological adaptation to make profitable), next newsprint 
and finally packaging. The firm itself has described in sorre detail its 
activities in these five ~as so it is not necessary to repeat that 
discussion here (MB, 1978). It might be noted, however, that the Iepartrrent 
at one tine also had a forest chemicals group comprising 8/9 people and 
concerned with extractjng chemicals frDm wood residues. While sorre patents 
were taken out the firm considered this research tangential to its main 
interests and so it was discontinued. 
With respect to the scope of MB's R & D activities the firm estimates 
about 86% of professional tirre involves applied, developrrental and technological 
transfer work. The R & D group do no basic research and the remaining tirre 
is spent on service work ("trouble shooting") particularly for the Building 
Materials Division which has only limited technical expertize (in contrast to 
the Pulp and Paper Group) and where the pmblem is "to solve probleIIB in a 
rrsnner in which local individuals can help" (pers. comm.). The R & D Group, 
however, clearly prefers not to becorre embroiled in such troubleshooting. 
In this regard, the R & D laboratory's location away from ffi3Ilufacturing 
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facilities (and head-office) is thought important to provide the "breathing 
space" necessary to concentrate on longer term problerrs. 
MB's R & D effort emphasizes process and to a lesser but growing extent 
product innovations in all the major branches of forest products. The group 
estimates the allocation of its resources in one and fiw year "rl'.ll1I1ing" 
plans and attempts to "think in terrrs of 10 years". I dear-> are submitted to 
the Product Groups before projects are determined and scientists assigned. 
In practice R & D priorities seem to be essentiaJly determined by long run 
operational problems facing the company. These priori ties may be set by a 
rather specific stimulus as, for example, occurred when the R & D group had to 
respond to the problems of the Saskatchewan waferboard mill acquired by the 
firm. The priori ties may also be set as a resulting of evolving appreciation 
and even anticipation of changing trends. This is particularly well derronstrated 
by MB' s recent innovations of several spe~iali ty papers which reflect the 
firm's foresight in recognizing technological changes in printing processes 
including a grx::wing demand for stronger but lighter paper. 
kl inherent characteristic of R & D is its uncertainty. Projects fail 
for one reason and another, it is difficult to calculate rates of return 
on investnent in R & D while the R & D process itself is often extrerrely 
lengthy. It took over a decade, for example, for MB, after experirrenting 
with a1ternati ve pulping processes to improve yields , to achieve cornrrercial 
success with respect to therrrorrechanical pulping (TMP). During the R & D 
process MB identifies various "milestones" or thresholds which rnay involve, 
for example, reports , seminars or the construction of pilot plants. This 
latter can occur within the R & D departrrent itself, elsewhere in company 
spc:i.ce (e.g. an operating mill) which is "rented" by the R & D group while 
pilot plants have even been connected to ID3.instream operations. In fact at 
the pilot plant stage technological responsibility for a project rnay shif~ 
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from the R & D departrrent. In any case throughout ine life of a project the 
R & D departrrent will maintain frequent and "open" corrnnilllication with MB's 
main business groups. Contact is also frequently n~quired with capital 
goods manufacturern and these are apparently ITDstly initiated by MB; local 
wood processing equiprrent supp1iern are regarded as 11 good" while for pulp and 
paper mill suppliern the firm Jm..lSt necessarily look outside B.C. Relationships 
with local engineering consultants , however, are stn::mg enough for MB 
to retain specialists to hire them. MB 1 s R & D group also makes sorre use of 
professionals and specialized facilities at Forintec' s Vancouver laboratory 
(notably its veneer peeling test machine) and Forintec's Ottawa laboratory. 
For fundarrental research MB largely relies on the Univernities, especially in 
the United States, and the Pulp and Paper Research Institute of Canada's 
(PPRIC) M:mtreal laboratory. When utilizing Association R & D, such as 
PPRIC, MB insists the results of their own projects are kept confidential. 
Notwithstanding its own significant investrrents in R & D MB does recognize 
the widely prevalent view arrong forest product finm m B.C. tha-1-
R & D 
is not necessary because of the industry's "openness" to new technological 
information. Certainly technological information is readily diffused 
through exchange visits, trade journals , annual technj c:AJ mn ferences and by 
the equiprrent supplied by capital goods manufacturern. In addition MB 
cited an example of a patent taken out 
on the chlorine dioxide bleaC'hing process by two companies in Central Canada 
which had given them a return of $20- 30 m in royal ties alone as the exception 
which proved the rule that patents are of little value in the forest product 
sector. In response the obvious question as to the value of intramural R & D 
MB clairred several corporate advantages. Firnt it was noted that R & D 
pernonnel help screen requests (and offern) for mill visits and in 
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conducting visits to other companies. (The very fact that visits are requested 
of course does suggest forest product firms do have techno1ogically distinct 
information which has value). Second, it was noted that there are now areas 
of rapid change , for example , with respect to newsprint: furbish and specialities 
where formal R & D inputs are crucial to cost-reductions and product develop-
rrents. Third, and ITDSt important, the respondents clained R & D provides MB 
with an important ma.rketing edge in two ma.in ways. First, it was clairred 
R & D provided a "head-start" over cornpeti tors during which MB enjoyed an 
exclusive advantage. The length of the head-start, or competitor's learning 
curve was estima.ted at 12-24 ITDnths (in contrast to the previously noted 
pre-innovation R & D process which might last 10-12 years). The second 
ma.rketing advantage clai:rred for R & D was that it instills o:mfidence in 
custorrers that problerrs can be solved if and when they arise. 
W1at evidence there is avai1able suggests that MB has been, and is, 
an important innovator and that the benefits clairred by MB for its R & D 
have likely been realized. Richard Schwindt (n. d. p. 142) for example, 
obtained lists of "major and less significant inventions and innovations" 
in various branches of forest products for between approximately 1950 and 
1975, and (qualitatively) reviewed MB' s perfornance as an inventor, innovator 
and adopter in comparison with other North ArrErican firrrs. Schwindt fornd 
MB's record to be "extrerrely good" in various wood products and the firm to 
be at least "active" in pulping and paperrnaking. MB' s record in pioneering 
forest product transportation systerrs, including ITDSt notably the self 
propelled, self loading, self dumping log barge, is also well known. Examples 
of recent important technological developrrents by MB include the pioneering 
of waferboard technology (thus helping to establish a viable wood processing 
industry in aspen covered areas) , innovation of plywood and waferboard panels, 
the innovation of several speciality papers, the innovation of new inking 
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rrethods for corrugated containers while MB was the first to introduce TMP 
in North Arrerica. Schwindt's (n.d. p. 146) conclusjon is worth noting: 
"In surrnnary, MacMillan Bloedel's progressiveness score seems high. 
The evidence indicates that it is an active inventor, innovator and adopter 
of new products and processes. Its research efforts seem to be directed toward 
those areas which are in need of emphasis". 
To use Freeman's (19 7 4) terns , and bearing in mind the dirrensions of 
technological change in the forest product sector, MB's technological strategy 
IIB.Y be described as at least "defensive" and possibly as "offensive". In 
its R & D prograrrure MB has taken the initiative in process and product 
developrrents and there is evidence that in sone respects at least MB has 
errerged as an international leader or is arrong the international leaders. 
MB's R & D effort has also been designed to resolve technological problems 
in envirorurents other than British Cblumbia - including, for example, the 
developrrent of waferboard technology in Central Canada and specialized logging 
equiprrent for Southern States. 
In contrast to MB, other forest product rnanufacturing firms have limited 
technological capability within B.C. and apparently no particular aspiration to 
do otherwise. Canadian Forest Products has a sIIB.11 'planning and developrrent' 
group located as part of its New Westminster plywood operations. Essentially 
the gruup is conce:med with improving gruving, printing, up-grading and 
embellishing methods in order to "differentiate" Canfor' s plywood and hardboard 
products. Much of this work, it was admitted, involves imitation al though 
this is apparently often costly. The group does not do pilot plant work, has 
limited liaison with other technical people, and its "developmental" work is 
clearly focussed on the technology transfer end of the R & D continuum. 
The only other forest product firm with a Vancouver based R & D group 
is Crown Zellerbach Canada. Havever, its Richrrond plant has no laboratory 
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facilities and it essentially provides a centre for a SJTu3.ll technical staff 
which provide "trouble-shooting" services to operating di visions, especially 
Building Materials. In recent years much of its work has been directed 
towards resolving pollution problerrs. It might also be noted that while TIDSt 
pulp and paper miJ ls throu17)1out the province haw technical groups attached 
these groups are principally involved in quality control, trouble shooting and 
technical adaptation within the mills. MB apart then, the technological 
stratecy adop-ted by the major Vancouver based forest product firrrs can be 
S1.llillIB.rized as "dependent". 
Association R & D: The principal forest product association R & D is 
perforrred by the Council of Forest Industries (CDIT). COIT's R & D laboratory 
was originally designed in the early 1950's as a structural testing facility 
for plywood and financed by the Plywood Manufactures of British Colurrbia (PMBC). 
The scope of COIT' s R & D has since been enlarged to include first lumber and then 
shingles and shakes al though plywood re1Tu3.ins the dominant focus receiving 
80% of the funding. 
COIT' s revenues derive from rrerrber company contributions which are based 
on volurre of production (so as a result MB is the largest single contributor). 
The annual budget and priorities are first determined by an R & D sub-cormnittee 
IIBde up of representatives from rrerrber companies. This cormnittee then advises 
each of the Plywood, Lurrber, and Shingle and Shake Cormni ttees which are 
therrsel ves comprised ITBinly senior executives of the rrerrber companies - and who 
have the ul ti:rrate decision-ITBking authority. COIT' s R & D is overwhelmingly 
product and marketing oriented and focusses on laboratory examination of the 
strength, physical and sectional properties of construction products; help in 
overseas marketing, stru< :tural testing of component sys terrs utilizing wood, 
the developrrent of technical literature, and representing the industry on 
national and international corrnnittees. 
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COIT provides information which nobody eh;e does, including the setting 
of colTITIDnly accepted standards , and perforrrs services beyond the reach of 
smaller companies. COIT has taken out patents to protect rrerriber companies and 
has contributed tavards the innovation of new panel products (e.g. COIT FORM) . 
As of 1979, havever, COIT employed just two professionals and 5 technicians, 
which is its la.vest ever level. COIT' s activities were in fact reduced after 
a review of its operations by the industry in 1978 and this derronstrates the 
rrost significant problem facing Association R & D such as that provided by 
COIT - vunerabili ty to short term thinking by 'sponsors' . HCMever, the 
potential scope of COIT's activities is also necessarily influenced by virtue 
of the fact that all rrerriber companies have access to COIT' s servires, informati' 
and patented products. (Thus rrenber companies with novel ideas must, like 
MB, demand secrecy). In this regard a sensitive issue arrong Canadian firrrs, 
including MB, is that foreign owned rrerrber companies of COFI provide a 
"pipeline" of information for parent companies without cost and without a 
reciprocal ar.rnngerrent. At the sarre tine, the extent to which subsidiary 
companies are willing to support Association R & D is presumably circUITBcribe' 
by access to parent rompany R & D services which also have to be paid for. 
These sane issues, in fact, confront joint industry-govemrrent sponsored 
R & D. 
Industry-<?ovemrrent Sponsored R & D: The two main industry-governrrent sponsorec 
agencies in B. C. a:re the Forest Engineering Research Institute ( FERIC) and 
FORINTEC (forrrerly the Western Forest Products Laboratory). Both FERIC 
and FORIN'IEC originated from <?ove:rrurent administered R & D programrres and, 
in fact, the latter only started to be cone "privatized" in early 19 79 . Both 
organizations have eastern counterparts. 
1d 
) . 
tic 
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FERIC began operations m 1975 in Vancouver with 5 professionals to conduct 
logging research. Logging research m Canada can be traced to the 1930's when 
the Federal Governrrent and Industry, as part of the Pulp and Paper Research 
Institute of Canada (PPRIC), established laboratories in Ottawa and M::mtreal 
respectively. PPRIC m:rintained a Woodland Section, comprising both a 
silvicultural group and a logging group, lllltil 1971 when it was disbanded. 
The idea was to start up a new organization - FERIC - to conduct R & D in 
logging only by hiring professionals from the Federal Governrrent' s Ottawa 
laboratory and PPRIC although in the event governrrent people did not transfer. 
By 1979 FERIC's Vancouver office employed 12 professionals, foresters 
and engineers and the budget reached $2. 3 M while a similar sized operation 
is based in Montreal. FERIC' s broad policy is set (or santioned) by a Board 
of Directors comprising rrembers from various Federal Governm:mt ~partrrents 
(including Industry, Trade and CDrnrrerce and Supply and Services) and the 
forest product companies. FERIC scientists and engineers generate five year 
plans while the actual programme is vetted by easterr1 and western advisory 
committees who rreet annually to direct research emphasis. Generally, FERIC's 
R & D involves wood harvesting, log transportation, and the environrrental 
impacts of logging. 
The m:rin objective of FERIC' s research and developrrent is to minimize 
the costs of logging by improving present practices , developing new systeITB 
3 
and rrachines and applying research results. This latter responsibility 
requires FERIC to closely cooperate with both forest product and equiprrent 
manufactu.rers including with respect to concept evaluation, field testing and 
developing pre-production rrodels. So far (not surprisingly given its short 
history) the stimulus to such cooperation has corre from industry. Im. example 
is provided by Northwood which wanted to develop a felling head whim resulted 
in less wastage. In this case the company provided the financing and the lom.ticn 
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for testing while a FERIC engineer designed the new Felling Head. The tool 
was built by a SID:3.ll manufacturer in Prince George and this firm will have 
ID:3.rketing autonoI!rf. The tool is being patented and in this respect the policy 
is to charge only cost to rrerrber corrpanies and ID:3.rket price to non-rrerrber 
rompanies. FERIC's R & D therfore is also strongly oriented towards the 
technological transfer end of the R & D continuum. 
FERIC's specialized functions have no doubt helped its credibility 
especially since logging research is being given greater priority by the corrpan: 
theJTEel ves. FERI C has derronstrated willingness and ability to cooperate with 
individual companies in the specifics of technological transfer. It is true 
that FERIC, like COFI, faces the problem:; resulting from rrerrbers on the one 
hand having equal access to information and, on the other, having limited 
willingness to sustain R & D over the long run. Indeed even federal gove:rrurent 
participation and support can no longer be regarded as a source of stability 
in view of the goverrurent' s sudden and sorrewhat irrational withdrawal of 
support for the Western Forest Products Laboratory (WFPL). 
The WFPL was first established by the Federal Govemrrent in 1918 and by 
1978 it errployed over 100 professionals and enjoyed a budget in excess of 
$3M. It focussed ffi3.inly on basic and applied research particularly with respect 
to wood processing activities and it undertook research on its own initiative 
and in response to corrpany requests including from consulting firms who 
lacked their own laboratory or library facilities. However, follcwing the 
reports of a joint industry-federal task force (1978 and 1979) the Federal 
Goverrurent decided to "privatize" the WFPL (and EFPL) in 1979 to create 
Forintec. While the existing (capital) facilities were in effect offered for 
nothing privatization also rreant withdrawal of federal back-up services. 
To replace these rrnnies the provincial governrrent has stepped in with 
financial aid while an industry committee struck to obtain financing for 
1 
j 
I 
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Forintec has so far (mid-1981) been unsuccessful. TI1e ostensible rationale 
for "privatization" is apparently that private sector R & D, in contrast to 
public sector R & D, is rrore likely to be channelled into profitable and useful 
2-Y opportlll1ities. In fact, considerable concern has been expressed, including 
by the Science COlmcil ( C.Ordell and Gilnour, 1976), regarding technological 
transfer for coITIJiercial use from goverrurent R & D laboratories in all sectors 
of the Canadian econoJ'IY. In this respect the forner WFPL also certainly 
had its critics including anong the respondents contacted during this study. 
an] On the other hand industry itself is frequently skeptical (and short-sighted) 
about basic research since its irnrrediately practical application(s) is 
usually unclear. Yet the applied research of to-day is often made possible 
by the basic research of years and even decades ago. Whether or not the 
Federal Goverrurent assurred that the R & D perforned by WFPL was of little 
value and would be replaced/replicated by the private business is not clear. 
~t 
However, it seerrs entirely unrealistic to believe that firms who themselves 
have consistently failed to support internal R & D prograrnrres would subsidize 
a joint industry effort, especially at short notice and at a tine when the 
sane firms were reducing the level of support for COIT. There is certainly 
a feeling that the rranner in which privatization was implerrented was irrational 
(see Whitnay, 1978; Digeldein, 1978). There was virtually no forewarning to 
the staff and no firm or even tentative cornmitm~nt of support from the private 
sector was obtained. So far Forintec has experienced significant losses 
of senior personal and has yet to define clearly its goals and priori ties. 
Notwithstanding these uncertainties its sheer size and scope rreans that it is 
a potentially formidable competitor to existing (or potential) specialized 
R & D firms. 
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Specialized R & D Firrrs 
As an alternative to intramural and especially to Association R & D 
specialized firrrs can potentially provide R & D to manufacturing companies 
on a oontract basis. While Econotech was the only such company in the Vancouver 
area and serving the fore st sector that could be found this tvoe of firm can 
offer important benefits to the sector. Consequently, the history and functions 
of Econotech are of interest. 
Econotech was originally the R & D Division of Colurrbia Cellulose 
(Cocel) which was first set up at Prince Rupert and then relocated to 
Vancouver in the rnid-1960's because of recruiting difficulties. At its peak 
Cocel's R & D Division employed 80-90 people and was largely concerned with 
pulping processes especially dissolving pulps which are used in a variety 
of end products including cellophane, plastic handles , cigarette filters and 
so on. Cocel, in fact, was closely integrated with its parent company, the 
Celenese Co. of New York. In particular, Cocel supplied Celenese with its 
only internal source of dissolving pulps and while Cocel' s R & D focussed on 
pulping the rather larger scale effort of Celenese in New York focussed on 
the pulp converting stages. 
As Cocel began to lose rrnney in the late 1960's the R & D staff becarre 
rrore errbroiled in operational problerrs , especially with respect to the kraft 
and sulphite mills, rather than with large tenn research regarding dissolving 
pulps. When it becarre clear (}:)eel would finally close daivn its R & D Division 
two employees in 1972 collaborated to purchase the laboratory and create 
Econotech. At that tine the company had 9 employees al though by 1978 it was 
back to 20. Econotech has contined to specialized in pulping R & D and it is 
particularly concerned with developmental work and technological transfer. 
Virtually all work is by contract, including by sub-contract, and their 
major custorrers are forest product firrrs , capital goods manufacturers and 
er 
ns 
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consulting engineers. While Eronotech does provide "ronsulting services" 
regarding operational matters it emphasizes independent evaluations of 
pulping processes utilizing its ONil equiprrent which includes complete pilot 
plant facilities for pulping and bleaching. 
Their work is split equally between large a.rd small companies while 
approximately 50-70% of their revenue is generated within B.C. Eronotech's 
growth, and its ability to export its services reflect various competitive 
advantages rrost notably because it has a high level of expertize in an area 
(dissolving pulps) where there are few competitors. Eronotech also clairrB 
a reputation for TIBintaining confidentiality. In this respect it might be 
noted that all its employees sign secrecy agreerrents while sorretirres technologists 
are therrBelves not inforrred about the underlying nature of the problem they 
are investigating. At the sarre tirre Econotech has accumulated considerable 
experience in a variety of mill environrrents throughout North Arrerica thus 
widening its problem solving abilities. Finally, it should be noted that 
Econotech's R & D is essentially complerrentary rather than competitive viz~ 
viz the major rompanies. In this regard firms such as Econotech provide a 
buffer against rapid hiring and firing by the major manufacturing companies. 
That is , Eronotech can not only provide R & D for firms lacking the appropriate 
expertize it can conduct 'overload' R & D for the majors. 
The small spec:i alized R & D supplier can therefore offer a potentially 
important role in the sector. Ironically, while the govemrrent has urged 
"privatization" so far Econotech has yet to win a single contract from either 
the federal or provincial governrrents. On the other hand, the creation of 
Forintec in effect represents subsidization of a competitor to Econotech. 
It may also be argued th.1t the lack of rrore companies like Eronotech results 
from a general lack of cr)rporate R & D since in many ways such small fi:rns 
represent spin-off and cornplerrentary developrrents to large scale industry R & D. 
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The Ca.pi tal Goods Manufacturers 
The ultimate goal of research and developrrent 1s the col1111Ercial 
innovation of a new product and/or process. Since this invariably involves 
investrent in new plant or at least equiprent, the capital goods manufacturing 
industries perform functions critical to an assessrent of technology capability. 
Indeed, in the case of the fore st product sector where process oriented 
innovation has dominated it is established opinion that capital goods firm; 
have theITEelves been in the forefront of the research and developrrent process. 
In the specific case of British Colurribia it is well known that a forest 
product based capital goods sector does exist. Indeed, according to a recent 
provincial governrrent publication, 
"Economics and the basic characteristics of the rough terrain have forced 
provincial manufacturers to be particularly innovative in design. The result 
is a highly sophisticated industry with a large degree of automation where 
necessary, advanced technological featl.lrBS and a good capacity to export" 
(Provincial Q:)vemrrent of B.C., n.d.p.) <rrw emphasis). The follcwing sections 
seek to determine the veracity of this staterrent regarding capital goods 
suppliers to the forest product sector. 
General Cllaracteristics of Capital Q:)ods Firrrs: Equiprrent manufacturers to the 
forest product industries were established in the earliest phases of indus-
trialization in British Columbia. One of the sampled fi:rrrs, for example, could 
trace its roots to a New Westminster plant built in 1876. Since then of course 
the capital goods industry has undergone much grcwth and change and in this 
respect the early emphasis on sawmilling equiprrent has been enlarged to 
incorporate logging equiprrent, forest product transportation products and 
plywood machinery manufacturers. None of the sampled plants , however, provided 
inputs of significance to the pulp and paper industry. 
'I· 
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Of the 34 plants interviewed 25 were (Table ll) privately owned all with 
their head-offices in British Colurribia. Of the remaining nine, seven were 
foreign controlled and two controlled elsewhere in Canada. Of the privately owned 
plants all but four were managed by an owner. Most of the corrpanies had been 
established prior to 1970 and in alrrost half the cases acquisition was the 
favoured rrethod of entry :ll1to the industry (Table 12). As would be expected the 
plants were typically small in terrrE of errployrrent and sales al though a quarter 
of the sample did belong to parent corrpanies who controlled nure than three 
plants (Table 13). The branch plants were also typically larger than the 
privately owned ones with respect to errployrrent and sales (Tables 14 & 15). l'bst 
of the firrrE with IIDre than one plant integrated their operations through material 
flews to sorre degree. All the branch plants, for exarrple, purchased sorre inputs 
from affiliated destinations (Table 16). Generally speaking affiliated inputs 
and outputs corrprised less than 25% of the value of linkages (Table 17). Ps would 
be anticipated affiliated input-output linkages were significantly associated 
with the larger plants (Table 18). With respect to rnaterial linkage characteristics 
several observations are worth noting. First, rrost plants obtained at least one 
quarter of their material inputs from within British Colurribia so that these 
firrrE are closely backwardly integrated within the local economy (Table 19). 
Outside of British Colurribia imports are rrore important than purchases from the 
rest of Canada. On the demand side all the sampled plants obtained sorre 
revenue from sales within British Colurrbia while rrost receive at least half 
their revenue from intra-provincial sales. Correspondingly sales to other parts 
of Canada and exports were not as significant al t..hough half the plants did 
derive sorre revenue from these sources (Table 20). 
Research and Ieveloprrent_ by Capital Goods Manufacturers: Surprisingly, 
half the sample clairred sorre internal R & D capability while rrost indicated 
they had design capability (Table 21). .t-breover, half the sample noted at 
least three-quarters of their sales derived from products which were locally 
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Table 11 
Organizational Glaracteristics of Sampled Capital Goods Manufacturers 
Central Status 
Private 
Canadian 
Branch Plant 
Foreign 
Branch Plant 
25 ( 7Lf%) 
2 ( 5%) 
7 (21%) 
Organizational Structure 
Entrepreneurial 
Managerial 
Managerial/:Cecentralized 
21 (64%) 
4 (12%) 
8 (24%) 
Table 12 
Head-Office location 
B. C. 
Rest of 
Canada 
Elsewhere 
25 ( 74%) 
2 ( 5%) 
7 (21%) 
Date of Origin of Sapp led Ca.pi tal Goods Manufacturers 
Pre-1950 
1950-69 
1970 
Tine. of Entry 
7 (27%) 
14 (52%) 
6 (21%) 
Source : Field Work 
Acquisition 
New Plant 
Empty Plant 
futhod of Entry 
15 (47%) 
13 (41%) 
4 (12%) 
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Table 13 
Size Olaracteristics of Sampled Capital Goods t1anufacturers 
No. of E!IPloyees 
Employee Class 
Plants Controlled by Parent Corrpany 
l - 24 
25 - 100 
100 - 500 
S9!!1Pled Plants 
18 (53%) 
9 (28%) 
7 (19%) 
Plant Class 
l 
] - 3 
3 
Annual Sales 
Sales 
<$1. 0 M 
$1-4. 9 M 
$5-9. 9 M 
$10-19. 9 M 
Sarrpled Plants 
12 ( 31-J % ) 
10 (29%) 
10 (29%) 
2 ( 6%) 
Table 14 
Sampled Plants 
17 (50%) 
9 (?7%) 
8 (21+%) 
Sampled Capital Goods Manufacturers: Organizational Status and Size of 
Plant CEmployrrent) 
Organizational Status 
Privately owned 
Branch plant 
Employment 
<25 
16 
2 
25 - 499 
9 
7 
2 
X cal = 4. 34 (Significant at . 05 level) CraIIEr' s V = .13 
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Table 15 
Sampled Capital C-oods Manufacturers: Organizational Status 
And Size 
Of Plant (Sales) 
Organizational Status 
Privately c:wned 
Branch plant 
<999 
10 
1 
Sales ('000) 
1 - 4999 
8 
1 
5 - 20,000 
5 
7 
2 
Collapsing the first two colu.rms x cal = 8. 53 (Significant at . 05 level) 
Craner's V = .27. 
Table 16 
Serr£ led Ca.pi tal GDods Manufacturers: Affiliated Input-Outp
ut Material 
Linkages, 1978 
Organizational Status 
Privately owned 
Branch plants 
2 
X cal = 20.09 (Significant at .
05 level) 
Cra:rrer' s V = . 59 
Privately owned 
Branch plants 
Affiliated 
None 
21 
0 
Affiliated 
None 
20 
3 
x2 cal = 7. 9 (Significant at . 05 level) Crarrer' s V = • 24 
Inputs 
Sorre 
4 
9 
Outputs 
Sorre 
4 
6 
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Table 17 
Linkage 
Affiliated Input - Ou:tPut Linkam:s, 1978 
Percentage Distribution By Value 
Inputs 
Outputs 
So~e: Fieldwork, 1979. 
0 
21 
23 
1 - 25 
11 
9 
Table 18 
25 + 
2 
l 
S?J!Pled Capital Goods Manufacturers: Ernployrrent Size and Affiliated 
Input - Output Llnkages, 1978 
Ernployrrent Size 
<25 
25 - 499 
Affiliated 
None 
14 
7 
Inputs 
Sane 
t~ 
9 
2 
X = 4.17 (Significant at .05 level) Crarrer's V = .12. cal 
<25 
25 - 499 
2 X cal = 3.63 (Not Significant). 
Source: Fieldwork. 
Affiliated 
None 
18 
8 
Output 
Sone 
3 
7 
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Table 19 
C£ographical Distribution of Material Inputs of Sampled Capital Goods 
Ma.n.uf actuers 
Source 
British Columbia 
Fest of Canada 
Imports 
0 
6 
12 
5 
C£o a hical Distribution of 
I:Estination 0 
British Columbia 
Fest of Canada 13 
Exports 14 
Source: Fieldwork, 19 79. 
Percentage Distribution By Value 
1 - 24 
1 
16 
17 
Table 20 
1 - 24 
2 
19 
15 
2L~ - 49 
6 
4 
6 
Percenta~;e 
24 - 49 
3 
1 
2 
Lt9 - 74 
6 
0 
4 
75+ 
14 
1 
1 
Distribution By Value 
49 - 74 75+ 
10 18 
2 1 
3 
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researched, developed and designed. In addition, only three plants relied 
rrore or less exclusively on foreign designs while products rrodified from 
'foreign' designs were not of any importance to the respondent firrrs (Table 22). 
Caution needs to be exercised in interpreting statistics regarding the 
characteristics of product technology especially since sorre respondents did 
not regard the various categories offered (see Table 22) as mutually exclusive. 
Nevertheless the general trend is clear and consistent with prevailing 
opinion: the products manuf acturered by equiprrent suppliers to the forest 
product sector are distinctive and reflect strong local input of technology. 
In other respects the diJIEnsions of technological capability are less 
irnpressi ve. Ernployrrent statistics , in particular, indicate that the forrral 
corrrrni ttrrent to R & D is miniffi3.l. Thus only one of the sampled firrrs ernployed 
any scientists at all and only one ernployed rrore than five engineers (Table 23). 
In total of the 32 sampled firms which provided inforJIE.tion 2 scientists, 
41 engineers and 77 technicians were ernployed. Of these the 9 externally 
controlled plants employed both scientists, 26 of the engineers and 42 of the 
technicians. Admittedly CanCar, which is reputedly the rrost innovative equipTIEnt 
manufacturer in B. C. and which ernployed 1 scientist, 7 engineers and 69 technicians 
m 1977 (Canada, Sup9ly and Services, 1978), is not included. CanCar, it might 
be added, is also foreign controlled. A minimum size for an "efficient" R & D 
effort in the capital goods industry is not known to the author - but only 8 
of the sampled firrrs employed 5 or rrore professional ernployees (including 
technicians). With respect to R & D budgets systeffi3.tic data is not available 
but with few exceptions the firms did not allocate flll1ds to R & D on a planned 
basis. Similarly, just a handful of the sampled firrrs have specialized 
laboratory facilities and/or design offices. Only eight of the sampled firrrs 
indicated they had taken out patents. 
Sorre further observations regarding the characteristics of product 
technology are worth noting. Neither branch plants nor privately 
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Table 21 
Capital Goods Manufacturers: R & D and r.e~ign Capability 
Yes 
No 
R & D 
Capability 
16 
16 
Table 22 
resign 
CapabiL~ty 
30 
4 
Olaracteristics of Product Technology of Sampled Capital Goods Manufacturers, 
Percentage· Distribution of Sales By Value 
Product I.evelopIIEnt 
LDcal 
Foreign 
Foreign Adaptation 
Source : Fieldvork, 19 79 
0 
3 
22 
15 
Table 23 
1 - 24 
4 
5 
10 
25 - 74 
7 
2 
3 
lo IIEnt of Scientists, Engineers and Technicians 
Number 
None 
1 
2-5 
6-10 
11+ 
By Sampled Capital ufacturers, 1978 
Scientists 
1 
Engineers 
16 
8 
8 
1 
Technicians 
12 
11 
7 
2 
1 
75+ 
17 
3 
1 
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Table 24 
Sampled Capital GJods Manufacturers: Organizational Status and 01aracteristics 
of PrOduct Technology, 1978 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Product D2velo:errent - local 
Organizational Status None S TIE 
Privately owned 2 19 
Branch plant 0 9 
These variables are statistically independent. 
Privately CMned 
Branch plants 
Sales of Foreign D2signed Products 
None 
J:3 
5 
S TIE 
-7-
2 
Obviously these variables are statistically independent. 
Privately owned 
Branch plants 
Sales of Products Adapated from 
Foreign D2signs 
None 
10 
3 
S TIE 
10 
5 
These variables are statistically independent. 
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cwn.ed plants are rrore or less likely to research, develop and design pn:iducts 
locally or to sell foreiwi designs (Tables 24a anc 24b). There is sorre 
indication that branch plants are rrore likely to nodify foreign designs than 
privately owned plants but the relationship is not statistically significant 
(Table 24c). With respect to claim> concerning R & D and design capability 
organizational status is not important (Tables 25a and 25b) although 
branch plants ~ likely to hire rrore engineers (Table 25c). This latter 
relationship is significant although the association is not a stn:>ng one. 
Surprisingly none of these relationships including various characteristics 
of pn:iduct technology, appe.ar strongly influenced by size of plant, (Table 
26). Larger firrrE do claim to have greater R & D capability (Table 27a) 
but in teT'IIB of employrrent of professionals (Table 27b) or of engineers 
(Table 27c) these claims are weak and cannot be statistically supported. 
Export 01aracteristics of Ca.pi tal C?oods FiT'IIB : The point of view offered 
by Bedford (p. 7) in the mid-1970's that "while sorre of the best sawmilling 
and logging equiprrent in the world is built in British Cblurrbia, export 
markets are not pursued with sufficient aggressiveness" is at least given 
indirect support by the behaviour of sampled firms. As noted (Table 20) 
only five plants exported 25% or rrore of their sales while 14 had no 
exports at all. In attempting to explain B. C. 's poor export perforrriance 
Bedford (p. 7) argued that firms "do not have the resources, both 
financial and hll.TlBI1, to pursue offshore markets. In fact, a considerable 
arrount of their scarce financial resources are spent on research and 
developrrent" . 
It is of course rrore usual and intuitively appealing to reverse Bedford's 
arguerrent - that is hypothesize that investrrent in R & D would encourage 
exporting. Indeed, it is interesting that the null hypothesis that there 
is no relationship between various indexes of technological capability and 
s 
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Table 25 
Sampled Capital Goods Manufacturers : Organizational Status and Technological 
Capability 
Organizational Status 
Privately owned 
Branch plants 
2 X cal = .67 (Not Significant) 
Privately owned 
Branch plants 
2 X cal = 1.68 (Not Significant) 
Privately owned 
Branch plants 
Research and Ieveloprrent Capability 
Yes 
12 
6 
No 
12 
3 
Iesign Capability 
Yes 
21 
9 
No 
4 
0 
Number of Engineers 
None 1 or ltlre 
14 
2 
10 
8 
2 
X = 4.15 (Significant at .05 level) Crarrr:>r's V= .12 cal 
I 
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Table 26 
Sarrpled Ca.pi tal Goods Manufacturers : F.:![1PlOY!f!=nt S i..ze and Product Technology 
diaracteristics 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Employrrent Size 
<25 
25 - 499 
Product llivelJp:rrent :Wne locally 
None 
2 
1 
Same 
13 
15 
Obviously these variables are statistically independent. 
<25 
25 - 499 
Products Based on Foreign llisigns 
None 
12 
10 
Sorre 
5 
5 
Obviously these var1iables are statistically independent. 
<25 
25 - 499 
Product Adaptations of Foreign llisigns 
None 
8 
7 
So:rre 
6 
8 
Obviously these variables are statistically independent. 
J 
:,i 
I 
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Table 27 
Sarrpled Ca.pi tal Goods Manuf acturern : Emplo~nt Size and Technological 
Capability 
(a) 
Ernploynent Size 
<25 
25 - 499 
2 2.0 (Not Significant). X cal = 
(b) 
<25 
25 - 499 
These variables are 
(c) 
<25 
25 - 499 
2 x cal= .82 (Not Significant) 
Fesearch cirid D:!veloErrent 
Yes No 
6 10 
10 6 
D:!sign Ca.pabili!Y 
Yes No 
15 2 
15 0 
statistically independent. 
Professional Ernplo~ees 
None Sone 
4 
2 
12 
14 
(d) Engineers 
<25 
25 - 499 
2 X cal= 1.18 (Not Significant). 
None SJne 
8 
5 
8 
11 
Ca.£abili ty 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Engineers 
None 
Sare 
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Table 28 
2 X cal = 2.94 (Not Significant) 
Jvbnitor R & D 
Yes 
No 
Expori:s 
None 
5 
3 
None 
4 
8 
~ 
Exports 
Sorre 
6 
15 
15 
6 
2 X cal = 4.15 (Significant at .05 level). Craner's V = .14. 
Exports 
(c) R & D Capability None SQ're 
None 
So TIE 
9 
3 
7 
13 
2 
X = 4.8 (Significant at the .05 level) CraITEr's V = .15. cal 
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exports can be rejected in the case of the sampled plants (Tables 28a, 28b, 28c, 
and 28d). Given the complexity of factors likely to influence export perform-
ance and bearing in mind only one of the sampled firms employed more than 5 
engineers, the strength of the associations, as indicated by Cramer's V, are in 
fact surprisingly good. The variables have, of course, been measured in a very 
crude way and reduced to 2, binary format. Nevertheless these results can be 
used to reject Bedford's point of view. 
It might be expected that larger plants would be more prone to export. 
However, this hypothesis cannot be statistically supported at the 5% level of 
confidence (Table 29a). The relationships between size of plant and sales to 
the Vancouver metropolitan area and to the rest of Canada are also not signi-
ficant (Tables 29b and 29c). Similarly, there is no relationship between 
organizational status and export levels, and sales to the rest of Canada 
(Table 30b and 30c). However, privately owned plants are much more likely to 
have markets within the Vancouver area than branch plants (Table 30a). 
In an open-ended qualitative way the sampled firms were asked to corrnnent 
about the problems they faced in achieving greater sales to the rest of Cc:mada 
and higher export levels. The pattern of responses revealed some general 
characteristics worthy of note. As would be expected, several of the smaller 
f inns indicated they were simply not interested in expanding their sales beyond 
British Columbia! Others referred to the costs of transportation to Eastern 
Canada as well as to competitors located there. However, there were observations 
offered by several respondents that are of particular interest to this paper. 
The first concerns marketing. Thus many corrnnents referred to "limited sales 
personnel", the "preferences given to local firms", the "hassle" of dealing 
overseas banks, the ina~ility to provide a "local service back'up", the "lack 
of sales outlets", only "one part-time salesman in Ontario" etc. The peculiar 
difficulties in exporting overseas were more formally recognized a few years 
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Table 29· 
Sampled Capital CDods Manufacturers: EJ;PloS.nt :;ize and the G2ographical 
Distribution of Input - Output teria.l Linkages 
(a) 
EgployITEnt Size 
<25 
25 - 499 
2 
X = 3.3 (Not Significant) cal 
None 
9 
3 
Export> 
Sorre 
9 
12 
(b) Sales Within the Vancouver Metro olitan 
<25 
25 - 499 
2 X cal= 1.3 (Not Significant) 
None 
3 
5 
Sone 
15 
10 
(c) Sales to the Rest of Canada 
<25 
25-499 
X
2 
- 1. O (Not Significant) cal -
None 
5 
6 
Some 
13 
9 
_, 
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Sampled Capital Goods Manufacturers: Organizational Status and the 
Geographical Distribution of Outputs, 1978 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Organizational Status 
Privately owned 
Branch plant 
Sales within Vancouver Metropolitan Area 
(i'.i5 Value) 
None Some 
1 23 
7 2 
2 
X - 19.1 (Significant at the .05 level) Cramer's V = .58 cal -
Sales to the Rest of Canada 
None Some 
Privately armed 8 16 
Branch plant 3 6 
These variables are statistically independent 
Export 
None Some 
Privately owned 10 14 
Branch plants 2 7 
These variables are statistically independent 
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ago when several equipment manufacture
rs created Carunillex, a cooperative sal
es 
agency. The succesc~ of Canmi1lex in pr
omot i.np; exports, however has not been 
detennined. 
The second set of corrunents that are wo
rth un:l.erlining referred to the dis-
tinctive nature of the industry in B.C.
 Thus the respondents variously noted 
"In Eastern Canada there is a different
 market need, that is light machinery 
there, heavy here". Or, "Types of mark
et in the East not the same technology 
needs or scale as in B.C.". Or B.C. of
fers "A unique technological market" e
tc. 
In attempting an assessment of technol
ogical progressiveness of capital goods
 
finns these canments provide useful ins
ights. 
The Technological Progn::ssiveness of C
apital Goods Firms: It is not easy to 
summarily interpret the technological p
rogressiveness of capital goods firms 
in Freeman's (1974) classes of technological str
ategies. The evidence is 
partial, subjective and to sane extent at least ap
parently contradictory. Thus , 
on the one hand the capital goods secto
r is distinctive and innovative while a
t 
the same time its formal ccmmitment to
 R S D is meagre and its export activit
y 
is less than what might have been expec
ted. In addition, although the question
~, 
naire data collected on this issue is v
ery limited it does indicate a relative
ly 
la.v level of technological liaison betw
een the sampled capital goods manufactu
r-
ers and consultants, governments and cu
stomers (Table 31). In particular there 
is virtually no contact with governmen
t laboratories, only four firms indicate
d 
'frequent' contact with engineering co
nsultants while more than one-quarter o
f 
the sample did not have any technologic
al liaisons with their customers. 
Clearly part of the explanation for the
 apparent paradox concerning the 
technological progressiveness of capit
al goods firms lies in the distinctive 
nature of B.C. 's forest resource and th
e industry's concentration on logging 
and wood processing technology - histor
ically a so-called "low-technology" I ,, 
industry. Thus many of the finns in th
e industry have pursued a "traditional t 
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Table 31 
Technologi-cal Liasons Between S9J11Pled Capital Coods Manufacturers and 
Consultants, Gove:rnrrEnts and Custorrers, 1978 
Extent of 
Liason 
None 
S01ll2 
Frequent 
Consultants 
13 
13 
4 
Source: Fieldwork, 19 79. 
Goverrurents' 
75 
5 
Cu.storrers 
9 
8 
12 
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technological strategy" in the sense of emphasis on the ideas of a...mer-
entrepreneurs, local experience and industrial craft skills. At the same time 
those firms have been innovative in responding to the peculiar technological 
needs of the local environment. The sampled capital goods firms, however, 
have been unwilling and/or unable to transfer their technological expertize to 
other environments beyond a relatively low level. Indeed, it appears that 
greater levels of exports and interprovincial sales are strongly limited by a 
lack of investment in R & D, including the design capability to modify products 
for alternative environments and a failure to build up extra-provincial 
marketing networks. While the reasons for this situation cannot be stated with 
certainty it is clear that the spatial planning horizons (and ambitions) of 
capital goods firms in Vancouver remain essentially provincial in scope. 
In contrast to B.C. based firms some capital equipment manufacturers based 
elsewhere have been more aggressive in expanding their corporate spheres of in-
fluence including into B.C. Indeed, over the past decade or so several import-
ant international firms have established production bases in B.C. - usually by 
acquisition of a local firm. As a result international firms have gained access 
to the B.C. market as well as to local managerial and technological knCM-how. 
As would be expected such externally controlled firms have not been motivated to 
build up large R E. D facilities and to expand exports from B.C. The fact that 
these branch plants tend to have somewhat more professional employees than the 
local traditional firms reflects at least in part their affiliation to parent 
canpanies who are typically more corrmitted to "professionalized" R & D so that 
to ensure proper integration of the corporate system all branches require a 
certain level of technological sophistication. One possible implication of 
these trends is that as the logp;ing and wood processing industry becorre TIDre auto-
ffi3.ted the R & D input will necessarily become more professionalized and in-
creasingly dependent on foreign technology. In other words, given present 
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trends, the future will likely witness an even rrore circUJJBcribed level of 
technological capability and one which is defined for the rrost part by ex-
ternally controlled firms. Ironically, outside of the capital goods 
industry Vancouver based engineering consultants exhibit aggressive market-
ing and a high level of design capability and in so doing create access to 
world markets for forest product equiprrent. 
The Consulting Engineers 
Even m the "mature" industry such as forest products investrrent in new 
equiprrent and plant requires considerable design engineering skills in 
selecting and intergrating a wide array of corrponents each of them being 
continually irrproved and involving varying degress of adaptation to local 
circUJIBtances. Experience is clearly critical in this work and so it 
should not be surprising to note that Vancouver based fi:rns have achieved 
a world-wide reputation for engineering resource developrrents particularly 
in the forest product sector. What is perhaps unexpected is the size and 
scope of consulting engineering in B.C. 
With respect to all types of engineering B.C., with 10% of Canada's 
population, has 15 % of its consul ting engineering capability. Precise 
estimates of size and irrportance of the engineering industry are difficult 
to make because the industry is largely privately owned and statistics are 
not collected on a regular basis. Ho;.vever, in 19 74 there were at least 
280 consulting engineering firms in B.C. errploying rrore than 6 ,000 people 
and which obtained total billings of $180 M. Of this arrount $30 M represented 
export incorre and $40 M was derived from oth3r provinces. While a detailed 
sectoral breakdo;.vn is not available it is like.ly that forest product 
C.Ompanyl 
Beak C.Onsultants, 
Acquired by Sand-
well in 1968 (60/ 
208) 
Environcon Ltd. , 
1/3 owned by 
Sirrons since ? 
(120/160) 
Forestal Intl. Ltd. , 
Ac-quired by Sand-
well in 1974. (20) 
S. G. Gardiner Eng. , 
Acquired by SNC of 
funtreal in 1980. 
(15) 
Hallrrark Eng. Ltd. , 
sold to employees 
1970-1980 ( 85) 
Reid, C.Ollins & 
Pss., affiliated 
with Sirrons since 
1978. (90) 
Table 32 
Selected Cl1aracteristics of Sampled Engineering C.Onsultants 
Origins of 
Vancou~r Offire 
1960 by Tom Beak, 
a chemist from U. K. 
1971 by three forrrer 
Beak employees 
1952 by H. Swantje 
1961/2 by S.G. 
Gardiner, then Olief 
engineer of Tahsis 
1964 by Mr. Hall then 
part of managerrent at 
MacMillan Bloedel 
1961, by 2 forrrer 
Forestal employees 
Other Offire Locations 2 
and Affilia,!ed Col!Panies 
funtreal (1958), Toronto (1959) 
Calgary (1972), Portland (1979) 
Saskatoon, St. John's 
Toronto, ltmtreal 1971/2 
becarre part owner of Olerrex 
labs, Calgary, 1978 
1970's acquired Agrisearch of 
Calgary (now closed) 
1971/2, acquired a tree seed 
extracting plant , Richrrond 
(Now at Aldergrove) Also 
nursery at Aldergrove (1972/3) 
landscaping business , Edrronton 
(1978), Seattle (1980), 
Anchorage. 
Initial ~rt Business Scope 
Year Place 
1974 U.S. 
1956 Pakistan 
1964 Peru 
1965 Finland 
Ecuador 
Envirorurental 
sorre energy 
related work. 
Environrrental 
so:rre fishery 
and energy 
related work. 
Forestry. 
Agro-forestry. 
Wood Products. c.n 
Wood Products. 
Forestry 
including seed 
production and 
mapping. 
cont'd. 
w 
1 Corrpany 
Sanctvell and Co. Ltd. , 
public corrpany since 
1969. (250/1200) 
H.A. Sirrons 
(International) Ltd. , 
(1200/2200) 
Norm:m Springate & 
f>.ss. (50/53) 
Stothert Eng. Ltd. 
(200/250) 
Origins of 
Vancouver Office 
1949 by P.R. 
Sanck.Jell 
1944 by H.A. Sirrons 
who since 1912 had 
been associated 
with the B.C. 
forest sector 
1968 by N. Springate 
then V .P. of Car-
gate Industries, a 
plywood equipIIEnt 
mfger. 
1966 by W.D. 
Stothert then a 
plant Illr3Ilager for 
C.Ocel , a forest 
product firm 
Source : Corrpany brochures and interviews. 
l 
Other Office Locations 2 
and Affiliated Corrpanies 
See Text 
Iecatur, G.A., Seattle, 
Montreal. Affiliated with 
Crippen Consultants , Reid 
Collins, (1978), Envirocon 
( ) all of Vancouver, 
Sirrons Pacquer of Seattle, 
Hurterfiber C.Ons. of 
M::mtreal and H.A. Sirrons 
Ltd. of Santiago 
Portland 
Winnipeg, funtreal, Seattle, 
Calgary, Nelson and Lagos. 
In 1977 acquired C.D. Schultz 
and their offices in 
Vancouver, Edrronton, Quebec 
and Seattle. 
Initial Export Business 
Year Place 
1953 
1954 
1962 
1969 
1969 
1974 
New Zealand 
U.S. 
Sweden 
U.S. 
C.Olurrbia 
Nigeria 
~ Figures in brackets indicate errployrrent size of Vancouver head-office/rest of corrpany. 
,-, 
L Where available year of fire established is given in brackets. 
Scope 
All aspects of 
forest sector 
plus extensive 
work in other 
areas. 
All aspects of 
forest sector 
plus extensive 
activities in 
other areas. 
Wood Products , 1 
Pulp and Paper.~ 
All aspects 
of forest 
sector and 
transportation 
facilities . 
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related work accounted for at least 10% of the intra-provincial work and con-
siderably more of the extra-provincial work (Consulting Engineers, 1977). 
As would be expected most consulting engineering firms in B.C. are small 
and in 1974, for example, 56% had less than four employees. However 2% of con-
sulting engineering firms in 1974 did have over 126 employees. Indeed, one of 
the unusual characteristics of the business in B.C. is the existance of a few 
~large firms, the two largest being H.A. Simons and Sandwell and Co. Both 
I 
of these firms were set up to serve the fore st industry and this industry remains I 
their most significant sectoral market. In total there are probably about 50-75 
consulting engineering firms engaged inf orestry related work and of these 
approximately 15 are of significance at least in terms of number of employees. 
Ten of these firms were contacted and a senior member interviewed regarding the 
evolution, size and scope of their activities (see Table 32). Several 
generalizations are worth noting. 
1. The emergence of consulting engineering in support of the forest pro-
duct sector has largely been a post-war phenomenon. The sector's growth has 
been extremely rapid since 1950 and this has clearly been an important stimulus 
to the business. r.ngineering consultants provide various services including the 
process and mechanical design engineering services necessary to erect new plants 
or introduce new equipment. They do virtually no laboratory, especially pilot 
plant work. HCNJever, while the engineers typically do not regard their work as 
"R & D" much of their activities clearly fall within the "technological 
transfer" stage of R f, D. 
2. The consulting engineers of Vancouver are to a large extent organized 
around two "core" canpanies, H.A. Simons and Sandwell & Co. These firms are ex-
tremely large by world standards and in 1978 they employed over 1000 people 
each. Sandwell is also exceptional for a consulting firm in that it is 
a public canpany - with billings in 1977 which totalled 
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$39 M (Financial Post Card Corporation Servio.~). The principaJ mrnpeti tors 
to these firrrs which are of a similar size are SNC of M::mtreal, Jacco 
Pourri, an organization heavily subsidized by the Finnish Govemrrent, u.nd 
a few Swedish and Japanese capital goods manufacturers who also provide 
consul ting engineering services. 
::3. The sampled consul ting engineering firrrs, rrost notably Sirron' s 
and Sandwell' s, have pursued strategies qf vertical and horizontal 
integration. Sandwell, for example, began as an engineering consultant to 
the pulp and paper industry and subsequently expanded to obtain expertize 
in forest surveying (by acquiring a controlling interest in Forestal in 
1974 and Alberni consult of London, UK), sawmill engineering (by 
acquiring a 20% interest in Carroll Hatch & Ass. in 1979) and in environ-
rrental impact analysis (by acquiring Beak in 1968). In addition, 
Sandwell has expanded horizontally or geographically through the 
establishrrent of business offires in other cities, notably Atlanta, Portland 
and London (U.K.), and by negotiating various joint venture arrangerrents 
with mmpanies in other countries, especially in Europe. Sorre of Sandwell' s 
affiliates, such as Beak, have multiple offices and in addition Sandwell 
controls companies whose activities often relate to forest product developrrents 
such as Agrisearch Investrrent Analysis of Ca1gary which is involved in 
agriculture and food activities. Similar stratep;ies have been pursue cl 
by H.A. Sirrons and to a lesser degree by Stothert. These three firrrs are 
therefore able to provide integrated engineering services to the forest 
product sector. 
4. Within the framework of Sirrons and Sandwell, subsidiary companies 
and affiliates still typically m:rintain their identity and enjoy considerable 
autonorry in seeking out and comp1eting projects. Indeed it is appropriate 
to suggest that the organizational structure of consul ting engineering j11 
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Vancouver imparts the advantage of large organizational size without excessively 
restricting entrepreneurial initiative. 
5. All the sampled firns have obtained business outside the province 
including the U.S. which is regarded by the firrrs therrsel ves as part of the 
"dom=stic" ma.rl<:et. The relative importance of 'export' incom= naturally 
varies by year and by company. Thus two of the sampled firrrs have 
hitherto restricted therrselves prirrarily to North America. However, the 
activities of several others have been literally global in scope. H.A. 
Sirron' s, for example, between 1954 and 1978, has provided engineering to 
new ffi3J1Uf acturing plants in over 30 different countries across six 
continents. The geographical scope of its 'feasibility studies' for 
wood based industries has been even rrore extensive. Furthernore it is not 
just the largest companies who are engaged in overseas work. Forestal, 
for example, has completed approxirrately 1000 projects in about 60 
colHltries in six continents. 
According to the firrrs large size and integrated services is particularly 
important as regards international ma.rl<:eting. Many third world countries 
in fact are requiring the consultants to make sorre financial corrmitrrent 
and to operate the projects they design at least for a while. Indeed, 
to reduce financial risks , Sirrons has set up a legally distinct corporate 
entity to administer international business. 
6. Beak and Environcon were the only two sampled consultants to own 
laboratory facilities - in both cases to help in environrrental impact 
analyses. In adcli t ion Reid Collins has its own nursey and has recently 
installed a oomputer rrapping facility. All the firrrs have office 
space and 'design offices'. Essentially, however, the competitiveness 
of the consul ting engineering firms rests on their experience in transferring 
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the technology of large industrial systems within the resource sector, 
especially forest products. 
7. In contrast to Japanese and Scandinavian cornpeti tors, the 
sampled consultants are not affiliated with capital goods manufacturers. 
This difference in busin('SS orp,nnization i:3 of :;one sip;nificance especial Jy 
in the competition to supply technoJ ogy to 1-hc, 'Jhj rd World. 1hus the 
sampled f irrns all argued consul ting should remain independent from 
:manufacturing in order to maintain the integrity of their evaluations and 
advice. On the other hand, they are faced with competitors willing to 
provide a complete technological package to clients in the Third World 
and in so doing are able to charge nominal consultants fees. 
As noted business transactions and technological liasons between 
engineering consultants and local capital goods manufacturers cb exist 
(see Table 31). The sampled consultant frequently cited examples of how 
their design work on export projects, to the extent that their terns of 
reference required specifications of equiprrent suppliers, had led to 
business for local manufacturers., Indeed several respondents indicated a 
preference for directing purchases of equiprrent to local sources. The 
ability of the consultants to generate such export business for local 
manufacturers, however, is limited at least by (a) the lack of local 
equiprrent manufacturers in the pulp and paper industry (b) constraints 
imposed by non-Canadian financial backers of overseas projects who 
apparently usually 'tie' financing to purchases of rrachinery from their 
own country and (c) the extent to which the clients themselves retain 
discretion to select equiprrent from alternatives suggested by the 
consultants. 
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It is therefore unlikely that the ties between capital goods manufacturers 
and consulting engineers are as strong as they might be. Whether or not 
closer ties should be encouraged is a ma.tter for conjecture, however. 
It is possible that closer integration of consulting engineering and 
equiprrent manufaeturers would generate economic benefits within the 
province and mir)lt alleviate the ma.rketing and technological constraints 
facing the manufacturers in increasing their export:S· However, there are 
also the questions pertaining to the political realities of 'tied aid' 
and of the business ethics - or at least preferences - to which the 
ronsultant:s subscrilx~. Nevertheless it is to such questions of technological 
linkage that a science policy for industry must ultimately address. 
Technological Linkages in B. C. 's Forest Product Sector 
At the present: t:irre the B.C. forest product sector exhibits both 
strengths and weaknesses in terrrs of its technological capabili t:y. Within 
the sector there are business and business sponsored enterprises which are 
involved in various aspects of R f, D which are innovative and which do 
export technology. In the critical area of design engineering, Vancouver's 
consul ting engineering cornrm.mi!Y_ provides a combination of entrepreneurship, 
contacts, expertize and experience in the transfer of forest product 
technology which makes it a world leader. 
The sector is technologically weak, however, because critical functions 
and linkages are missing or limited in scope. Arrong the forest product: 
enlerpriseG in the provjncf:, for example, there is only one important 
intn~ural R f, D laboratory; there is only one specialized R & D firm 
serving the fon~st product sector; and arrong Vancouver based capital goods 
rnanuf acturers only one of the sampled firrrs employed scientists at all and 
rrore than 5 engineers. In view of the relatively low level of R & D 
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activity pursued by the firrrs thernse l ves it is not s urvri_s:rng to find that 
Association R & D is relatively poorly supported also and that it 
remains vunerable to short tenn changes in industry CJ.tti tudes. Furthernorc 
the Federal C?overrnrent' s privatization policy of its aim long established 
forest product based R & D seems to have 'accomplished' only a reduction 
in Federal expenditures rather than an increase in R & D activity. 
As for the nature of 'technological liaisons' arrong institutions withjn 
the forest product sector it needs to be emphasized that in this report 
they were investigated only in a rather superficial wav. C'0nscquently 
any generalizations must be speculative. With this caveat in mind the 
overriding observation offered is that while there are important 
transactions between forest product firm;, R & D laborntories, equiprrent 
ITBDufacturers and engineering consultants "the system" is by no rreans as 
integrated as it could be. There simply does not exist a concentration 
and clustering of R & D facilities taking advantage of, and contributinr, 
towards , a network of inter-establishrrent linkages pertaining to material 
inputs, labour and inforrra:tion etc. Yet such agglomerations of R & D 
activity are widespread elsewhere (see Malecki , 19 7 8). In addition, it 
has already been pointed out that transactions between engineering consultants 
and capital goods suppliers remain at 'arrrs length' and as a result 
important spin-off benefits to B. C. are probably lost. Indeed in a 
general sense the capital goods manufacturers appean:>d locally technologica11y 
isolated and certainly not part of any discen1ible systeffiltic set of R f, D 
interrelationships arrong them;el ves or with other institutions. 
Similarly the strong impression gained from the interviews was that there 
was little ongoing interaction between private sector R & D and !))ven1rrent 
and academic institutions in B.C. This was again especially true of 
the capital goods finns who perhaps naturally enough, generally 'blam:~d' 
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the latter for being irrelevant to the needs of business. It is possible, 
however, that the failure of these manufacturers to take advantage of 
public sector research facilities in part results from their own failure 
to fully invest in R & D. 
In providing an admi t-t:edly controversial explanation for the lack of 
technological capability througtlout Canadian industry the Science Council 
has emphasized the role of foreign ownership. With respect to levels of 
technological capability in the forest product sector of British Columbia, 
especially as reflected in R & D laboratories operated by forest product 
manufacturing firrrs and by capital goods manufacturers, there is little 
doubt that foreign ownership exerts an important - and negative - influence. 
Indeed, all the parent companies which control subsidiary companies or 
branch plants in forest product manufacturing in B.C. and which operate 
R & D laboratories have centralized them entirely outside Vancouver and 
the province (Table 32). In the case of Rayonier this actually involved 
gradually running down a laboratory which in the early 1950' s, when owned by 
Alaska Pine, employed 30-40 professionals. Certainly there are reasons to 
believe that in this sector R & D is under-invested in B. C. In Washington 
State, for example which has a smaller timber harvest than B. C. (1970 data) 
one firm employs rrore R & D employees than are found in all of B. C .. 
FurtheTIIDre, it is important to recognize that centralized R & D 
laboratories are an important rrechanism by which parent companies integrate 
their global operations - subsidiaries are not 'free to choose' where they 
purchase their R & f'. Witness, for example, the 01airrnan of Scott Paper (of 
Vancouver) staterrent: 
"A new agreerrent is being completed with Scott Paper Company of 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, calling for both managerrent and financial 
participation in research and developrrent prograJIB to be carried out by 
·- 62 -
Table 32 
:Research and fuvelopment Facilities of Foreign Owned Forest 
Product Companies Operating in British Col u.mbL1, 19 77 
Boise Cascade 
Charnption InH. 
Crown Zellerbach 
Evans Products 
International 
Paper 
:tvEad 
ITT Rayonier 
Scott Paper 
Location 
Vdnc ll iver, WA 
Chaniblee, GA 
Boise , IDl\HO 
InH. Falls, MI 
Brewster, NY 
Minneopolis , Jv1i.I 
Hamilton, OH 
St. Paul, MI 
Cama.s, WA 
Kirkwood , MD 
Antioch, CA 
Sanl.eandro, CA 
West Lynn , OR 
Corvallis, OR 
Tuxedo Park , NY 
Mobile, AL 
Georgetown, SC 
Philadelphia, PA 
Longview, WA 
Bainbridge , GA 
01illicothe, OH 
Whippany, NJ 
Shelton, WA 
Philadelphia, PA 
Holyoke, MD 
Westbrook:, ME 
Emphasis ~Joyment 
Pulp and Pdper 22 
Ruildinp; Materials 18 
Wood & wast utili- 7 
zatiort 
ribreboard, hard-
board 
12 
C'£1lulose fibres 17 
Folding cartons 
Pulp 27 
C'.ontainers 
Pulp, paper & 169 
forest biology 
Fibreboard 2 2 
Paper 17 
Packaging materials 3l~ 
Publication papers 8 
Wood 49 
Pulp & Paper 26 7 
Pul n 96 
Corrugated Containers 10 
Milk containers etc. 11 
Plywood, panelboarcl 5 
Forest genetics 15 
Pulp, paper•, converted 110 
papers 
Pulp & paper 
Pulp f, paper 
cont'd. 
387 
so 
159 
CDrnpany 
Sirnpson Timber 
Weyerhaeuser 
- n3 -
lDcation 
Redm::md , WA 
Vicksburg, 11I 
TacoJTB, WA 
" 
" 
" 
" 
Centr'alia, WA 
Hot Springs , ARK 
SourDe: Jacques Cattell Press. 
Emphasis Ernployrrent 
Wcx)d 22 
PrLnting papers 11 
Technical Support 216 
Administrative 102 
support 
Pulp & Paper 163 
Logging 62 
Wood 102 
Forestry 103 
Forestry 69 
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Scott in their U.S. facilities and elsewhere. 111.e a.greerrent is part of a 
long-term arrangerrent which joins together all of Scott's international 
affiliates in a way that will significantly increase finuncial, marketing 
and technical resources avaialble for developrrent of new products and 
processes. It will take effect in 1979". C.Jcott Paper Limited, 1978, p. 1). 
There are several econom1.c implications which dY' i.sc from such formal, 
and less formal, links between parBnt company R & D facilities and 
subsidiary operations. First, payrrents for R & D services constitute an 
incorre leakage. For B.C. between 1969-71, for examp1e, this may have 
arrounted to $100 M (Hayter, 1981, p. 111). Second, payrrents for R & D 
represent a direct loss of employrrent opportunities in managerial and 
scientific occupations. Third, there is a loss of spin-off benefits not 
only in tenrB of multiplier impacts but also in term; of reduced demand 
for complerrentary suppliers such as Econoterh .=ind nor>sibly even for 
academic ancl nuhlic sector se:rvices. FinrJJlv 1 it ·1c:; rior~sihle that 
priorities and goals set for parent company R & D as a whole may not overlap 
with local needs. To the extent that B.C. 's comparative advantage in 
forest products is becoming rrore dependent on impruved utilization, 
conversion and marketing of existing timber supply region this latter 
concern is likely to becorre rrore significant. 
Foreign ownership can certainly not be regarded as the only constraint 
on greater levels of R & D in B. C. 's forest product sector. After all 
O:x::el once had the larrrest P F, n facilit-y in Vancouver (although it is 
worth noting Cocel was its parent's only forest product subsidiary). The 
truncating effects imposed by foreign ownership however, have clearly 
been reinforced by inward looking entrepreneurial attitudes especially 
arrong equiprrent manufacturers and inadequate govemrrent policy whic.h has 
neither provided carrots (e.g. tax incentives) nor t1ticks (e.g. "No R 0 D 
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no trees") of an appropriate nature. Industry, i i:self has often urged 
for greater governnent incentives for R & D. Yet, any governnent attempt 
to so stimulate R & D cannot practically ignore tj1e fact that rrost of the 
large firrrs operating in B. C. already have access to the R & D supplied 
by their parents. Certainly general appeals to invest in R & D are 
unlikely to be successful - as the lack of enthusiasm to support Forintec 
would seem to testify. Indeed, if policies to prorrote R & D in the forest 
product sector are to be effective the total set of functions and inter-
relationships arrong relevant actors including capital goods suppliers, 
consul ting engineerB, sITB.11 specialized firms, governnent and academic 
depart:nents as well as forest product manufacturing firrrs must be 
considered. In this respect future research might usefully focus rrore 
explicitly on the nature of technological liasons or knowledge transfers 
within B.C. and bet-ween B.C. and the rest of the world. 
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